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emnstanees, the confession 
without any inducenwnt lwld out to the accused. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Review.-Wlwre the trial 
court preliminarily determined on evidence that 
defendant's confession was free and and the jury 
reached the same conclusion when tho matter submitted to 
them on proper instructions, tho as so n·solvod 
defendant is binding on the Supreme Court. 
[3] !d.-Rights of Accused-Aid of CounseL-Whore the trial 
court instructed the that a dnfPndant in a criminal case 
has a constitutional right to counsel at all of the pro-
ceedings, that l'Pfusal to grant his r;oqnest for counsel consti-
tutes a denial of fundamental and that whether or not 
he asked for counsel if he did, whetlwr or not he was 
denied an to consult with counsel arc circumstances 
·which the may consider in determining whether a written 
confession w~s voluntary or involuntary, the determina-
tion, supported hy amphe evidence, tlwt defendant's request 
for an attorney and that offlcers' conduct relative 
thereto did not result in a denial of his fundamental rights is 
conclusive on appeal. 
[ 4] !d.-Rights of Accused-Aid of CounseL--To constitute de-
privation of due proress the denial 
represented by counsel in every 
ha nl so fatally infected the 
of accused's right to be 
of tlw proceedings must 
or his trial and convic-
tion as to violate the fundamental nspcds fairness and 
result in a miscarriage of 
[5] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of CounseL-The burden of show-
ing unfairness and of denial of defend-
[1] See CaLJur.2d, EvidPnce, ~ 131; Am .• Jur., 
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 
Criminal Law, § 167 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: 
Law, § 480; [3-5] Criminal 
Criminal § 104: Criminal 
§ 970(3); [10] Evidence, § 18; [11] Criminal 
Criminal Law, § 281; [13] Homicide, § 236. 
§ 482. 
et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Criminal 
§ 296; [7] 
Law, 
Law, § 1315; [12] 
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[6] of Testimony of 
as true a of the testi-
disbelieve the remainder or have a 
correctness. 
Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Fair Trial.-The burden 
on defendant to show that conduct he 
trial. 
Id.-Appea.I-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting At-
misconduct of the attorney in 
defendant's conversation with an attorney to tell 
that no coercion was used to make defend-
did not result in prejudice where, on 
all that occurred in the district attorney's 
office at the time in was excluded from evidence. 
[9a, 9b] Id.-New Trial-Misconduct of Jury.-The trial court did 
defendant's motion for new trial for mis-
in alcoholic beverages after 
submission of the case to them where there was evidence to 
support the court's conclusion that the consumption of such 
beverages had not prejudiced defendant nor resulted in a 
miscarriage of justice. 
[10] Evidence-Judicial Notice.-It is a matter of common knowl-
edge that the effect of a small quantity of liquor consumed 
by such as "one drink and no more" by ten 
jurors and a double Manhattan by one, followed by a large 
meal, a sleep and breakfast, would be entirely dissipated 
and could have no influence on the mental operations of the 
jury. 
[11] Criminal Law-Appeal-Questions of Law and Fact.-After 
conviction all intendments are in favor of the judgment and a 
verdict will not be set aside on the ground of insufficiency of 
evidence unless the record clearly shows that on no hypothesis 
is there substantial evidence to support it. 
[12] Id.-Order of Proof-Corpus Delicti and Confessions.-Where 
the corpus delicti of murder was proved by the finding of 
decedent's vvhich had been and stabbt>d and a 
doctor's 
wounds and deft>ndant's confc~sion was admis-
sible to show that he had been in wait for decedent and 
had stabbed and choked with the re'mlt that she died. 
[13] Homicide-Instructions-Punishment.-An instruction in a 
murder that if the find defendant guilty of 
first degree murder it will be their duty to determine which of 
two penalties shall be the death penalty or life im-
350 PEOPLE v. CROOKER [47 C.2d 
the as life 
will so in their using a 
form that will be handed them when retire to deliberate, 
and that if should fix the as death they will not 
the death penalty in the verdict and will say 
about 1s proper, and a "silent yerdict" of the 
is sufficient to the of death. 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
and from orders denying motion to set aside the verdict and 
denying a new trial. Stanley 1\Iosk, ,Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty, affirmed. 
Robert \V. Armstrong, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, ·william E. James, 
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney 
(Los Angeles), Jere J. Sullivan, Ij'red N. Whichello and Lewis 
Watnick, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent. 
McCOMB, J.-This is an automatic appeal from a judg-
ment of guilty of murder in the first degree after trial before 
a jury. 
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 
People, it discloses that Norma McCauley on July 4, 1955, 
attended a barbecue dinner at which Mr. Baird was present. 
About 12 :15 a. m., ,July 5, 1955, he accompanied Mrs. McCau-
ley in her car to her home. Two other persons followed them 
in Mr. Baird's ear. They arrived at Mrs. McCauley's home 
at 1100 Somera Road, Los Angeles, around 12 :30 a. m. Mr. 
Baird entered the house with Mrs. McCauley, said goodnight, 
walked out to his car and left in it with the persons who had 
followed him to Mrs. McCauley's residence. 
Defendant, who had been employed as a houseboy in the 
deceased's home, freely and voluntarily wrote and signed a 
confession in which he stated that late in the evening of 
.July 4, 1955, he went to the deceased's home, entered the 
house through the rear and hid in a eloset in her children's 
room until they were asleep. 
He stated in it that Mrs. McCauley came home about 
12 or 1 o'clock and he waited until she was in her own bed-
she began to doze and was goiug to 
he found a kitchen knife about 10 inches 
about 6 inches. He then went back to 
upon which she was the knife 
and knelt beside her for a long time. After 
she was he took her throat in his hands and she choked 
and started to scream. 
the he reached for the knife and pushed 
on it, bnt 1\Trs. :McCauley still made sounds and 
struggled. He then choked her with some clothe's which he 
put around her throat. After this he left the lwuse, returned 
to his apartment and fell asleep until shortly before noon. 
After trial the jury returned a verdict reading: "\Ve, 
the Jury in the above entitled action, find the Defendant, 
John Russell Crooker, Jr., guilty of murder, a felony, as 
charged in ... the . information and find it murder of 
the first degree.'' 
Defendant relies for reversal of the judgment on these 
grounds: 
First: That he was denied due process of law because of 
the refnsal of the investigating officers to allow him to consult 
with an a.ttorney upon demand being made that he be per-
mitted, to do so. 
This contention is without merit. Defendant testified that 
he made repeated requests for an attorney from the time of 
his arrest and throughout hi;,; qu0stiouing by the officers. 
Officer Gotch testified that the first time defendant asked 
to call an attorney was at the Central Station, when the follow-
occurred: 
"Q. \Vhen he made the r0quest for an attorney, what did 
you tell him? A. I asked him who did he want for an 
attorney. 
"Q. And he said whaH A. He stated he didn't know. 
"Q. What else did he say on this subject? A. I stated to 
him that after our investigation was conclud0d he could call 
an attorney, and if he didn't have funds to hire an attorney, 
·when he went to Court a public defender ·would be assigned 
to handle his case. 
''He then stated that he had a friend who had been an 
instructor at Pepperdine College that would probably handle 
the case for him. I asked him who the name was, and he 
for an 
not have to say 
testified that no force was 
confession was and 
[1] 'l'he applicable test as to 
fession is whether, considering the 
sion was freely and voluntarily made without any inducement 
held out to the accused. (Rogers v. 46 Cal.2d 
3 at 10 [11] [291 P.2d 929] .) 
[2a] An examination of the record discloses conflicting tes-
timony, that of the officers denying any force or that promises 
were made to defendant in consideration of the confession he 
made, and defendant's statement that he was slapped on one 
occasion and struck in the stomach on several occasions. In 
addition, when he took the stand, defendant was examined 
in detail as to his confession by the deputy district attorney 
and in each instance he admitted the officers had not told him 
what to say or write in his confession. 
The conflict in the testimony was thus squarely placed before 
the jury, whose finding was resolved against defendant's con-
tentions, and it is binding upon this court. (People v. Mehaf-
fey, 32 Cal.2d 535 at 548 [7], 553 [11] [197 P.2d 12] .) 
[3] 'l'he trial court instructed the jury as follows: "You 
are instructed that a defendant in a criminal case has a 
constitutional right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings. 
Refusal to grant a prisoner's request for counsel constitutes 
a denial of fundamental rights. "'Whether or not the defendant 
asked for counsel, and if he did, whether he was or was not 
denied an opportunity to consult with counsel, are circum-
stances you may consider, among in determining 
whether the written confession was voluntary or involuntary." 
Thus the question was 11resented to the for its deter-
mination as to whether defendant's request for an attorney 
and the officers' conduct relative thereto resulted in a denial 
of defendant's fundamental and the found against 
defendant's contention. In view of the evidence, we are of 
the opinion the jury's determination was amply supported. 
Nov. 353 
may 
clause of the fourteenth amendment. To con-
of due process, the denial of the 
rig·ht of the accused to be counsel in every 
stage of the must have so infected the 
regularity of his trial and conviction as to violate the funda-
mental of fairness and result in a of 
justice. v. 814 U.S. 236 S.Ct. 
280, 86 L.Ed. 166] ; Stroble v. 343 U.S. 181 at 
1D7 [72 S.Ct. 599, 96 J_;.Ed. 872].) 
[5] The burden of shovving unfairness and a miscarriage 
of justice by the denial of defendant's right to counsel in 
some stage in a proceeding against him rests upon the defend-
ant. (Stroble v. California, supra, at p. 198.) 
'fhe Supreme Court of the United States in Stroble v. Cali-
fornia, supra, quotes ·with approval from Ad'ams v. United 
States ex rel. JrlcCann, 317 U.S. 269 at 281 [63 S.Ct. 236, 
87 L.Ed. 268, 143 A.L.H. 435], where it said: "If the result 
of the adjudicatory process is not to be set at naught, it is 
not asking too much that the burden of showing essential 
unfairnes::; be sustained by him who claims such injustice and 
seeks to have the result set aside, and that it be sustained not 
as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality.'' 
From an examination of the record and the statements of 
fact set forth above, it appears the police ofiicers' conduct 
relative to defendant's request for an attorney in no way af-
fected the voluntariness of defendant's confession. On the 
contrary, the record discloses ample evidence to support the 
jury's .finding that it was freely and voluntarily made without 
duress or the promise of reward. 
In the one instance in which defendant requested an attor-
ney the officers' attitude thereto in no way affected the 
voluntariness of the confession nor did it in any vmy result 
in any unfairness to defendant at the trial. There was no 
miscarriage of justice. 
[2b] Second: That defendant's confession was obtained in 
violation of his constihdional J"i.ghts and was inad-
missible in evidence. 
This contention is likewise devoid of merit. _As pointed out 
above, there was a conflict in the evidence as to whether the 
47 C.2d-12 
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rrhcre also a conflict in the 
tlw facts upon which the conclusion was neces~ 
that the confession was free and voluntary, by 
the court in the first instance and finally by the jury to whom 
the matter was submitted on proper instructions. Since the 
evidence the finding of the trial court and the 
their that the eonfession was and volun-
made and not in violation of any of defendant's consti-
tutional is binding upon this court. (People v. Mehaffey, 
supm.) 
In v 24 Cal.2d 870 at 876 [4] [151 P.2d 
251], Mr. Justice Shenk thus states the rule: "The pro-
cedural steps in the matter of receiving confessions in evidence 
are outlined in the decisions. At the time the confession is 
offered, it is incumbent on the prosecution to Jay the founda-
tion for its introduction by preliminary proof showing that 
it was freely and voluntarily made. (Citing authorities.) 
Before the confession is received, however, the defendant if 
he requests it must be accorded the opportunity to introduce 
evidence to overcome the prima facie showing, and if incrimi-
nation is dependent upon the confession a refusal of the 
court to permit such opportunity may constitute prejudicial 
error. (Citing authorities.) It is the function of the court 
in the first instance to resolve any conflict in the evidence on 
the subject (citing authorities), and if the court concludes 
that the confession was not free and voluntary it has the 
power and is in duty bound to withhold it from the jury's 
consideration. However, if there is evidence that the con-
fession was free and voluntary, it is within the court's discre-
tion to permit it to be read to the jury, and to submit to 
the jury for its determination the question whether under 
all the circumstances the confession was made freely and 
voluntarily. (Citing authorities.) In such a case the court 
passes preliminarily on the question of the voluntary nature 
of the confession and its admissibility and although it may 
determine that the confession is voluntary and admissible, 
its ruling is not binding on the jury; and it is for that body 
'to determine in the last analysis whether a confession is 
freely and voluntarily made.' (Citing authorities.) The jury 
determines the issue of the nature of the confession, that is, 
whether it is voluntary or involuntary, on all the evidence on 
the issue; and the court is not required to receive evidence 
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authori-
Third: That the tn~al court ct·recl in the in-
stnwtion relative to to have 
connsel at all is set 
a.bove, the : "Should yon the evidence in 
this ease that the defendant made eo1msel which 
were refused the officers who had him in custody, in 
that I instruct ymt that People's Exht'bit 18 in evi-
dence, the written of the should be 
absolutely disregar-dccl by ymt in the deter-mination this 
case." 
There was no error in the omission from the instruction 
which the court gave. [6] The jury may accept as true a 
portion of the testimony of a witness and disbelieve the 
remainder or have a reasonable doubt as to its correctness. 
(People v. Hill, 126 CaLipp.2d 378 at 380 [3] [272 P.2d 
113] .) [7] The burden is upon defendant to show that 
through wrongful condnet he was deprived of a fair trial. 
(People v. Guarino, 132 Cal.App.2d 554 at 558 [3] [282 P.2d 
538]; Stroble v. California, snpra.) 
Defendant does not contend that his confession was false. 
On the contrary, as pointed out above, 1vhen he was examined 
during the course of the trial as to the statements in the 
confession he admitted he had made them and only denied 
he had in fact killed the decedent. 
[8] Fourth: That certain action which took place in the 
distt·ict attorney's office constituted prejudicial error. 
It did not. In the afternoon of July 6 defendant was taken 
to the office of the district attorney, \Yho asked defendant to 
repeat the confession he had previously written. Defendant 
asked the district attorney if he would let him l1ave an 
attorney. Mr. Roll, the district attorney, l1ad l\1r. Simpson, 
the attorney suggested by defendant, called on the telephone, 
and when defendant, while talking ·with Mr. Simpson said 
that they were making him answer their qnrstions, J\:Ir. Roll 
interrupted the conversation and told the attorney there 1ms 
no coercion used at all and everything defendant said was 
free and voluntary. 
Upon objection of defendant, all that occurred i.n the district 
attorney's office was excluded from the evidence. It is there-
fore obvious that no prejudice resulted to defendant from 
anything that might haye occurred at that meeting. 
[9a] Fifth: The h·ial court en·ed in denying defendant's 
356 PEOPLE v. CROOKER [47 C.2d 
rnisconduct the j7try in 
snbmission of the case to 
them. 
This contention It was that after 
the case \Yas submitted to the and prior to their evening 
meal on December 1 10 of the 12 had consumed 
"one drink and no more" and that one drank 
a double l\Tanhai tan. After consumed the alcoholic 
the had the entire night and 
had breakfast They then resumed 
did not go out to lunch but had lunch 
and reached a verdict at about 1 :30 in the 
afternoon on December 1955. 
[10] It is a matter common knowledge that the effect 
of the quantity of alcohol consumed in the instant case, 
followed by a large meal, a night's sleep and breakfast, would 
have been entirely dissipated and could have had no influence 
upon the mental operations of the jury. In passing upon a 
similar question in People v. Van Horn, 119 Cal. 323 at 333 
[51 P. 538], this court said: "To set aside a verdict on 
account of these facts ·would be preposterous." ( Cf. People v. 
Leary. 105 Cal. 486 at 491 rt seq. [39 P. 24] ; People v. 
Sansome, 98 Cal. 235 at 239 [33 P. 202] ; People v. Bemmerly, 
H8 Cal. 299 at 301 [3:3 P. 263]; People v. Deegan, 88 CaL 602 
at 605 [26 P. 500]; People v. Romero, 12 Cal.App. 466 at 470 
[107 P. 709] .) 
[9b] In the rase the trial court passed upon the 
question here presented on a motion for a new trial and held 
that the consumption of the intoxicant had not prejudiced 
defendant, nor had it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. 
The evidence amply supports this conclusion. 
Sixth: The evidence was to support the jttdg-
ment. 
This proposition is untenable. [11] After conviction all 
intendments are in favor of the judgment and a verdict will 
not be set aside upon the ground of insufficiency of the 
evidence unless the record clearly shows that upon no hypothe-
sis is there substantial evidence to support it. (People v. 
Lindley, 26 Cal.2d 780 at 791 [7] [161 P.2d 227].) 
[12] Applying this rule to the facts in the instant case 
the record discloses the corpus delicti was amply proven by 
the finding of decedent's body which had been strangled and 
stabbed and the testimony of the doctor that decedent's death 
Nov. PEOPLE v. CROOKER 
C.2d 348; 303 P.2d 753] 
was due to the stab wounds and 
357 
the confession of defendant was admissible to show he had 
been in wait for the decedent and had stabbed and 
choked with the result that she died. 
[13] Seventh: That the 
to was 
In the circumstances of the record before us this contention 
is likewise untenable. The trial court instructed the jury 
relative to the penalty as follows: ''The law of this state 
provides that every person of murder in the flrst degree 
shall suffer death or confinement in the state prison for life, 
at the discretion of the jury that finds him guilty. If you 
should find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, 
it will be your duty to determine which of the two penalties 
shall be inflicted, the death penalty or confinement in the 
state prison for life. If you should fix the penalty as confine-
ment in the state prison for life, you will so indicate in your 
verdict, using a form that will be handed to you when you 
retire to deliberate, but if you should fix the penalty as 
death, you will not specify the death penalty in the verdict 
and you will say nothing about punishment in the verdict. 
In determining which punishment shall be inflicted, you are 
entirely free to act according to your own judgment." 
It is urged that the form of verdict submitted to the jury 
under the foregoing instruction does not adequately permit 
the jury to express in the verdict its intention as to the penalty 
when the death penalty is imposed. As noted, the instruction 
provides that "If you should fix the penalty as confinement 
in the state prison for life, you will so indicate in your 
verdict." The argument seems to be that this court should 
also require that the trial court give an instruction providing 
that ''If you should fix the penalty at death you should so 
indicate in your verdict,'' and accordingly provide such a 
form. It is sufficient to note that the form of verdict which it 
is nrged that this court now require was furnished to the 
jury and returned with the death penalty imposed in the 
case of People v. Green, 217 Cal. 176, 177 [17 P.2d 730). (See 
also People v. Orcalles, 32 Cal.2d 562, 567 [197 P.2d 26], 
footnote 1; People v. Hall, 199 Cal. 451, 456 [4] [249 P. 859]; 
People v. Green, pp. 209, 224, footnote 3 [302 P.2d 
307] .) 
'l'he judgment, order denying defendant's motion to set 
358 PEOPLE v. CROOKER [47 C.2d 
aside the 
trial are each affirmed. 
Schauer, J., and 
concurred. 
of the following 
statement from the opinion: "The due process 
c1am;e of the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitu-
tion and article I, section 13, of the California Constitution 
guarantee a defendant the right to be represented by counsel 
in every stage of the proceedings, and deprivation of this 
guarantee may be a violation of the due process clause of 
the fourteenth amendment. To constittde deprivation of due 
process, howevM·, the denial of the right of the accttsed to be 
by cotmsel in every stage of the proceedings must 
have so fatally infected the 1·egularity of luis trial and convic-
tion as to violate the fundamental aspects of fairness and 
result in a nviscarriage of justice. (Lisenba v. Califor'nia. 314 
U.S. 219, 236 [62 S.Ct. 280, 86 L.Ed. 166] ; cf. Stroble v. Cali-
fornia, 343 U.S. 181 at 197 [72 S.Ct. 599, 96 I.~.Ed. 872] .) " 
Part of the italicized statement is found in the Lisenba 
case. Hmvever, it affirmatively appears in the opinion in 
the r~isenba case (230, 231) that defendant had the advice 
of counsel at all times. The Supreme Court was there speaking 
of an allegedly coerced confession. It is said ( pp. 236, 237) : 
''As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the 
failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the 
very concept of justice. In order to declare a denial of it 
\Ye must find that the absence of that fairness fatally infected 
the trial; the acts complained of must be of such quality as 
necessarily prevents a fair trial. Such unfairness exists ·when 
a coerced confession is used as a means of obtaining a verdict 
of guilt. \Ve have so held in every instance in which we have 
set aside for want of due process a conviction based on a 
confession.'' 
In the Stroble case an allegedly coerced confession was also 
involved. There counsel was denied the privilege of consult-
ing defendant during his interrogation by the district attorney. 
rrhe Supreme Court said (at pages 197 and 198, citing the 
Lisenba case) that "Upon the facts of this case, we cannot hold 
that the illegal conduct of the law enforcement officers in not 
taking petitioner promptly before a committing magistrate, 
Nov. PEOPLE v, CROOKER 
[47 C.2d 348; 303 P.2d 753] 
359 
coerced the confession which he made in the District Attar-
office or in any other way deprived him of a fair and 
impartial triaL 
''As to the refnsal of the prosecutors to admit counsel 
during their interrogation of petitioner, counsel stated that 
he had come to the District office at the request 
of petitioner's son-in-law merely to inquire of as to 
his guilt. At no point dicl ask 
In light of these facts, the District 
interrupt the examination of which had been pro-
ceeding for almost an hour, so that counsel could make inquiry 
for petitioner's son-in-lmv, does not constitute a deprivation 
of due process, either independently or in conjunction with 
all other circumstances in this case." (Emphasis added.) 
In In 1·e JJiasching, 41 Cal.2d 530, 534 [261 P.2d 251], 
defendant requested counsel, and a continuance on the ground 
that he had been "confined to bed." His reqm'st was denied. 
"\Ve there said that "Under all the circumstances this pro-
cedure amounted to a denial of petitioner's constitutional 
right to counsel. It follows that his conviction cannot be 
permitted to stand and that he should be remanded to custody 
for further proceedings in the municipal court in conformity 
with his right to counsel. (In re McCoy, 32 Cal.2d 73, 76-77 
[194 P.2d 531]; see In re Egan, 24 Cal.2d 323, 337 [149 P.2d 
693] ; cf. People v. Lanigan, 22 Cal.2d 569, 572-577 [140 
P.2d 24, 148 A.I,.R. 176] .) " In People v. Lanioan, 22 Cal.2d 
569, 575 [140 P.2d 24, 148 A.hR. 176], we said, quoting from 
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 75, 76 [62 S.Ct. 457, 
86 L.Ed. 680], "To determine the precise degree of prejudice 
sustained by Glasser as a result of the court's appointment of 
Stewart as counsel for Kretske [a codefendant] is at once 
difficult and unnecessary. The 1·ight to have the assistance 
of connsel is too f~tnclamental and absolute to allow courts to 
indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice 
arising from its deniaL [Citing casrs.]" (Emphasis added.) 
\Ye continued: ''Although the Sixth Amendment is appli-
cable only to trials in federal courts (Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 
455 [ 62 S. Ct. 1252, 86 L.Ed. 1595] ) , the same right is protected 
in this state by article 1, section 13 of our Constitution pro-
viding that 'In criminal prosecutions, in any court whatever, 
the party accused shall have the right . . . to apprar and 
defend, in person and with counseL' '' 
In People v. Robinson, 42 Ca1.2d 741, 74\ 746 [269 P.2d 
6], we again quoted from the Glasser case and tbe Lanigan 
360 PEOPLE CROOKER [47 0.2d 
"Knm have held that 
rmmsc•1 so fnndamrntal that 
reasonable time to allow 
and the failnre 
of 
In Yir'w of thr Cllassrr rase :md California rasps follovv-
ing ;i, it apppm·-.; to me that the statement in the' majority 
opinion hrrPtofore set forth is ineorreet. If 1ve eontinue to 
follow thr Glasser ease. we win find it "1mnrcrssary" to 
determine the exad amount of arising from a flenial 
to (1efendant of cotmsr'l at eycry of thr proceeding in 
any court >YhateH~r! As IYm' "aid i11 the Glasser ease '"rh0 
right to havr the assistanee of counsel is too fnndamental and 
absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as 
to the amount of pre:jndice arising from its deniaL" 
I have: heretofore pointed out that the Stroble case is not 
like the case at bar since there the i!efrndant did not himself 
ask for counsel. 'l'hr citations of the Stroble and McCann ( 317 
U.S. 269 [63 S.Ct. 236, 87 hEel. 268, 14:3 A.L.R. 435])* 
cases are, therefore, inapplicable here. 
The defendant's confession was unc1oubtcdly an important 
factor in defrndant 's conviction of the crime of which he was 
arcnsed. The confession was made without benefit of counsel 
whieh had been requested by defendant. It appears to me that 
if our constitutional safeguards are to be observed. they should 
be obscrvrd to the letter. This concept is forcibly declared 
b~- the Supreme Conrt of the Unitecl States in a recrnt decision 
(Ullmann Y. United 8totcs. :1fi0 U.S. 422 [76 S.Ct. 497, 100 
L.Ed. 511), decided JHarch 26, 1956). Mr. Justice Frank-
fnrter speaking for tile eonrt stated (p. 501): "Nothing ne\Y 
can b(• put into the Constitution except tbrough the amenda-
tory process. Nothing olcl can be taken out without the same 
proeess. 
"No donht the constitutional privilege may, on oecasion. 
savr n man from desrrts. It ·was aimed at a 
more far-reaehin;:; evil-~-a recnrrenee of the Inquisition and 
the Star en'll if not in their stark brntallty. Pre-
*'The 1\IeC:ann ease was inl'olvcd with the question of waiver of counsel 
and trial by jury. 
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vention of the 
than occurrence of the lesser 
ence with a in human nature to abu::;e power, the 
Founders sought to close the doors future abuses 
law-enforcing ""''·~uc,'"" 
"As no constitutional guarantee so none 
should suffer subordination or deletion. It is appropriate to 
read the conviction in a memorable address by 
Senator Albert J. Beveridge to the American Bar Association 
in 1920, a time when there was also manifested impatience 
with some of the restrictions of the Constitution in the pre-
sumed interest of security. His appeal was to the Constitution 
-to the whole Constitution, not to a mutilating selection of 
those parts only which for the moment find favor. [He said:] 
'If liberty is worth keeping and free representative govern-
ment worth saving, we must stand for all American funda-
mentals-not some, but all. All are woven into the great 
fabric of our national well-being. We cannot hold fast to 
some only, and abandon others that, for the moment, we 
find inconvenient. If one American fundamental is pros-
trated, others in the end will surely fall. The success or failure 
of the American theory of society and government, depends 
upon our fidelity to every one of those inter-dependent parts 
of that immortal charter of orderly freedom, the Constitution 
of the United States." (Beveridge, The Assault upon Ameri-
can Fundamentals, 45 Reports of American Bar Assn., 188, 
216 [ 1920].) To view a particular provision of the Bill of 
Rights with disfavor inevitably results in a constricted appli-
cation of it. This is to disrespect the Constitution.'' 
I am of the opinion that defendant's requested instruction 
relative to the jury's disregard of the confession should have 
been given. Defendant was entitled to, and should have been 
accorded, the right to counsel at the time he made the confes-
sion. As a result, the confession was obtained in violation 
of his constitutional rights and should not have been considered 
by the jury. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
19, 1956. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
